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IN DEFENSE OF DEFERENCE
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer*
Guy-Uriel E. Charles**
For my part, as I went away, I reasoned with regard to my-
self: "I am wiser than this human being. For probably neither
of us knows anything noble and good, but he supposes he
knows something when he does not know, while I, just as I do
not know, do not even suppose that I do. I am likely to be a
little bit wiser than he is in this very thin: that whatever I do
not know, I do not even suppose I know."
You want the death penalty? Persuade your fellow citizens
[via legislation or by amending the Constitution] .... You
don't want abortion? Persuade them the other way .... Judges
have no more capacity than the rest of us to determine what is
moral.2
In late October, 1997, University of Michigan students un-
able to gain admission to its undergraduate school filed a lawsuit
in federal court against the University. The plaintiffs maintained
that the infusion of race into the admission process violated their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 A few days later,
while answering general questions about the case, and specifi-
cally about the University's admission process, University Presi-
dent Lee Bollinger remarked that "[t]his [suit] is a campaign to
reverse the constitutional decision supporting higher education's
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington;
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
** Russell M. and Elizabeth M. Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minne-
sota Law School. We wish to thank the many friends and colleagues who read previous
drafts and offered terrific advice. In particular, Kevin Brown, Jim Chen, Ken Dau-
Schmidt, Michael Gerhardt, Ajay Mchrotra, and Christy Ochoa.
1. PLATO, Apology, in FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES 70 (Thomas G. West & Grace
Starry West trans., 1984).
2. Too Many Morally Charged Questions in Court, CNN.COM, Sept. 21, 2004, at
http://cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/21/Scalia.democracy.ap/ (quoting Justice Scalia on a speech
to the Ethics and Public Policy Center).
3. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 97-CV-75231-DT (E.D. Mich. 2001); Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 97-CV-75928-DT (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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efforts to diversify.",4 Most appropriate to our general inquiry,
the President stated that "I think inevitably the Supreme Court
will and must speak to this issue."5
This was a remarkable prediction, on two fronts. First, the
modern affirmative action6 controversy presents one of the most
important and vexing questions of social policy in the last quar-
ter century. And the Constitution does not offer clear guidance
for resolving this difficult question, if any at all.' Hence, this is-
sue appears to be the perfect candidate for a properly democ-
ratic resolution, at the hands of those to whom we entrust such
matters. 8 Generally, one would suppose that complex questions
of social policy should be resolved no other way.
And yet, secondly, President Bollinger proved to be deadly
accurate. This last Term, in the Michigan Cases,9 the Supreme
Court offered its constitutional views about the use of race in
higher education. Its approach was rather surprising. Before the
Court decided the Michigan Cases, and as a direct result of the
Court's mechanical approach to race conscious measures, the
resolution of these cases appeared pre-ordained. First, the Court
would assert that race had in fact been used in admission deci-
sions. Indeed, the University admitted as much. As such, the
Court would apply its strict scrutiny test, and would demand not
only that the state assert a legitimate and compelling interest,
but also that the means in question be narrowly tailored to these
purported ends. The Court would then offer its view about the
4. John A. Woods, Battle Lines Drawn in U-M Discrimination Suit, ANN ARBOR
NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997, at Al.
5. Id.; see Ronald Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, 45 N.Y. TIMES REVIEW
OF BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1998, at 91, 91 ("Sooner or later the Supreme Court will be required
to take [an affirmative action case in higher educationi for review.").
6. For the purposes of this Essay we use the term affirmative action broadly to
mean any decisions any decision-making process where a state actor takes race into ac-
count. When used in this way, as we do throughout this Essay, affirmative action and race
conscious decision-making may be used interchangeably.
7. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209,47 DUKE L.J. 187, 192 (1997) ("There
is ... nothing in the Constitution that is capable of resolving this social policy dispute
without simply elevating one policy preference above the other for reasons of subjective
normative appeal. The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is simply indeterminate
with respect to the constitutionality of [affirmative action].").
8. For support for this general proposition, see New York City Transit Authority
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (explaining that the wisdom of policy initiatives is
properly left to the political branches, and that "the Constitution does not authorize a
federal court to interfere in that policy decision").
9. See Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
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myriad harms of racial classifications, '0 after which it would con-
clude that race may not be used by admission officers except in
an extremely limited set of circumstances that no set of facts
would ever meet. In keeping with its recent cases addressing the
use of race in districting for example, the Court might also
choose to apply its "predominant factor" test;" it would matter
little, of course, as the Court would likely invalidate the pro-
grams in question under either test, by a five-to-four vote, with
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy at the center of the storm. This
was the ultimate outcome anticipated by most court-watchers in-
cluding the Hopwood Court 2 and the Michigan District Court.'3
In a series of surprising moves, the Court discarded the
script. In the law school case, Grutter v. Bollinger, a Court ma-
jority endorsed Justice Powell's view in Bakke that the goal of
diversity in college admissions "can justify the narrowly tailored
use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public univer-
sities."'' 4 As far as holdings go, this one is quite unremarkable.
Far more interesting and of greater significance is the way the
Court arrived at this conclusion. "Context," stated Justice
O'Connor writing for the majority, "matters when reviewing
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause."' 5 In the context of higher education, the "Law School's
educational judgment that... [racial] diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer.", 6
In his opinion dissenting from the Court's holding, Justice
Thomas exclaimed that the Court's deference to the Law
School's educational judgment is "antithetical to strict scru-
tiny."' 7 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that the
Court's "application of ... [strict scrutiny] is unprecedented in
10. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993):
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society.
They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that in-
dividuals should be judged by the color of their skin.... Racial gerrymandering,
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions.
11. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995):
The plaintiff's burden is to show.., that race was the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particu-
lar district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated
traditional race- neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations.
12. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D.Mich.,2001).
14. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
15. Id. at 327.
16. Id. at 328.
17. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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its deference."' 8 Not to be outdone, Justice Kennedy described
the Court's application of strict scrutiny as "nothing short of per-
functory" for "accept[ing] the University of Michigan Law
School's assurances that its admissions process meets with con-
stitutional requirement."'' 9
In this Essay, we defend the Court's deference to the judg-
ment of educators and admissions officials on the necessity of
raceconscious admissions. Our central thesis is that the Michigan
Cases are properly understood as representing the proposition
that affirmative action in higher education-and perhaps race-
conscious state action more broadly--is centrally a question of
public policy and less so a question of constitutional law. Neither
the constitutional text nor constitutional doctrine provides direct
guidance on the constitutionality of race-consciousness by state
actors. Fundamentally, affirmative action is a moral question and
an issue of educational policy. These are precisely the ques-
tions for which judges are less useful and administrations are
at a comparative institutional advantage. Though the Court
may have a role to play, that role would be played at the mar-
gins. Because the Constitution has very little to say about pref-
erential race-conscious admissions by state actors, this is an area
that the judiciary should constitutionalize only at the boundaries
and leave room for public policy makers to implement their pre-
ferred policy choices.
Prior to the Michigan Cases, and in light of the Court's in-
evitable incursion in the affirmative action controversy, the
countermajoritarianists' traditional fears appeared true: in the
face of a complex question of social policy, the Court would
forge ahead and purport to resolve this difficult issue.20 Yet the
18. Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20. Ironically, some of the most influential critics of the power of judicial review are
only too quick to ask the Court to reverse the policy course of affirmative action pro-
grams. Alexander Bickcl, one of the prominent constitutional figures of our time, pro-
vides a leading example. While at the center of the Warren Court storm, on the one
hand, he showed a great deal of concern for the judiciary's "undemocratic" transgres-
sions. When it came to affirmative action measures, conversely, he was willing to set
aside all prior concerns and ask for the Court's hand in overturning these programs. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, DeFunis v. Odegaard
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 133 (1975); cf. Lino A. Graglia, The Constitution and "Fundamental Rights," in
THE FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 86, 86 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1991) ("[Con-
stitutional law's] potency ... rests entirely on a misunderstanding, the mistaken belief of
the American people that judicial declarations of unconstitutionality are in a meaningful
sense based on the Constitution.") and id. ("The nightmare of the American intellectual
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Court did no such thing. Part I uses the Legal Process School to
justify the Court's restraint in the Michigan Cases. Part II pro-
vides an internal justification-based upon the Court's cases ad-
dressing the limits of state action on the basis of race-for the
Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger to defer to admissions of-
ficers.
I. THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS, INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCE AND THE FAMED DIFFICULTY
The role of an unelected, unaccountable judiciary in democ-
ratic society has been the subject of much controversy. In recent
memory, and as a direct response to the travails of the Warren
Court, we have witnessed the resurgence of a strong, mostly
negative reaction to the judicial branch and its perceived un-
democratic transgressions. This recent charge has been led by
Alexander Bickel, who coined the phrase "countermajoritarian
difficulty" to encompass the seemingly troubling notion that a
judiciary may interpose its constitutional reading against the
people's current preferences, as evinced strictly by legislative
enactments. "[Wlhen the Supreme Court declares unconstitu-
tional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive,"
Bickel wrote a generation ago, "it thwarts the will of representa-
tives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises con-
trol, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. This,
without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. . .[I]t is the
reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemo-
cratic." 2
From the time of Bickel's influential contribution, constitu-
tional scholars have spent countless hours attempting to diffuse
the "countermajoritarian" dilemma.22 They still do.2 We ques-
clite (broadly defined) is that control of public policy will fall into the hands of the
American people. The function of judges, acting in the name of the Constitution, they
believe, is to prevent that from happcnning.") with Lino A. Graglia, Podberesky, Hop-
wood, and Adarand: Implications for the Future of Race Based Programs, 16 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 287 (1996) (demonstrating a strong dislike for racial preferences, and hailing the
virtues of justices who are willing, scarce constitutional guidance notwithstanding, to
strike them down).
21. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2nd cd. 1986); see HENRY STEELE COMMAGER,
MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 55 (1958) ("Whatever the logical support for
the theory [of judicial review,] it cannot be found in the philosophy of democracy if by
democracy we mean majority rule; whatever the practical justification, it cannot be found
in the defense of fundamental rights against the assault of misguided or desperate majori-
ties.").
22. See Steven Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
2004]
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tion neither Bickel's conclusions nor the various responses and
counterstories that followed in his wake. Instead, we take the
teachings of the legal process school to heart, particularly its fo-
cus on the strength of institutional responsibilities. Put simply,
the Court must not attempt to solve complex social problems in
isolation. Instead, the Court must establish broad and forgiving
constitutional boundaries, thus allowing the affected parties
room for implementation.24 This Part argues that the affirmative
action debate falls squarely within this prescription.
of Law, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 689, 712 ("[R]esponding to the countermajoritarian difficulty
has been an important staple on the menu of constitutional theory since the appearance
of Bickel's influential book."); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1288 n.2 (1982) ("The 'countermajoritarian
difficulty' has spawned the central line of constitutional scholarship for the last thirty
years."). See also Croley, supra, at 712 n.66 (documenting some of the many published
acknowledgments to Bickel's influence).
23. Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half. The Problem with Novelty in Constitu-
tional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921 921 (2001) ("[T]he 'counter-majoritarian difficulty'
remains-some forty years after its christening-a central theme in constitutional schol-
arship. Indeed, one might say that reconciling judicial review and democratic institutions
is the goal of almost every major constitutional scholar writing today.").
24. See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point-Metro and
Adarand, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875, 884 (1996) (arguing that vague and undefined standards
not only empower Congress, but also give the Court "leeway in exercising judicial re-
view, backed by confidence that future Courts would stop something that was really
wrong."). Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 136 (1976) (explaining that in order to avoid linking both preferential and ex-
clusionary policies similarly, the applicable "mediating principle of the [Equal Protec-
tion] Clause is clearly and explicitly assymetrical, one that talks about substantive ends,
and not fit, and one that recognizes the existence and importance of groups, not just indi-
viduals.").
In specific reference to the affirmative action controversy, see Terrance Sandalow,
Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42
U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 703 (1975):
[A decision against affirmative action] would necessarily rest upon predictions
that are equally conjectural and, therefore, equally personal. If judges are un-
easy about resting constitutional interpretation upon such foundations, the
remedy is not to fashion principles that mask the underlying choices. The rem-
edy, rather, is candidly to avow the choices that must be made and to develop
doctrines that consign ultimate authority for those choices to the legislature,
where in a democracy it rightly belongs.
See also Neal E. Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REV. 15, 16 (1991) (argu-
ing for a "limited judicial and a broad legislative role"); John Hart Ely, The Constitution-
ality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 731-32, 741 (1974) (con-
tending that difficult moral questions, such as affirmative action, must be left to the states
and the political process); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and
the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1996) ("[Alffirmative action should be
settled democratically, not judicially.").
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A. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY COMES TO
SCHOOL: MAKING SENSE OF POLICY-MAKING
In their monumental The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks
warned that consensus on some questions of policy would be
hard to achieve, if not altogether impossible. For this reason, and
as an "alternative to disintegrating resort to violence," they
counseled for the principle of institutional settlement, "the es-
tablishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. 2 5
The questions raised by the affirmative action debate fit squarely
within this principle. In general, these questions boil down to a
debate about what criteria admissions officials may take into ac-
count.2 6 These are complex and ultimately "intractable" ques-
tions, to be sure.27 They are also policy questions in their clearest
form. Some of these arguments are made on the strength of our
hopes for a better society, others on social utility and the weight
of the costs and benefits at issue. These are not constitutional ar-
guments.28 A sampling of the many arguments deployed here
25. HENRY M. HART, JR., AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (W. Eskridge & P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
26. Cf. Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH &
AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 106, 122
(1996) (arguing that "[s]etting qualifications for a position is not an exercise in arbitrari-
ness. Rather, it is an exercise in discretion, which operates against a background of con-
siderable uncertainty as to what constitutes the correct standards and how best to apply
those standards in the practice of searching, identifying, and assessing qualified candi-
dates"); Alasdair Maclntyre, Some Sceptical Doubts, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
UNIVERSITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 264, 264 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1993) (ques-
tioning the assumption that "in academia we already possess an adequate and generally
agreed conception of what it is to be either the best qualified candidate for a particular
academic appointment or at least a candidate as well qualified as any other").
27. Devins, supra note 24; cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Af-
firmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 893-94 (1994) (explaining that the debate has be-
come "a bitter stalemate"); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 WEST VA. L. REV. 111, 124 (1991) (arguing that the debate
"has come to a dead-end").
28. Compare Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (Powell,
J.) (concluding that layoffs, unlike hirings, are too burdensome on the affected parties)
and Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is
odious to classify persons along racial lines) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the plan is not too unfair to the laid off teachers, does not
stereotype beneficiaries, and is not racially disrespectful); see NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC
DILEMMAS, 1964-1982 (1983); BARRY R. GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE: IS
TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY? (1978); RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS,
RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); Charles Krauthammer, Why We Need Race
Consciousness, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE : THE NEW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY 141 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991); see also Jerome
McCristal Culp, Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Ar-
guments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 171 (1994); see also Jed
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471 (1997) ("If I had to choose, I
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provides ample illustration of this view.29 The arguments come
under three general rubrics.
First, and while looking at the institutional level, critics have
leveled the charge that affirmative action plans bring about "a
cost in loss of efficiency and productivity. ''3 The argument is a
simple one. In hiring workers, and even when admitting students
to institutions of higher education, decisionmakers must always
seek better qualified applicants, to those who not only meet the
required institutional requirements but rise above their competi-
tors in skill and merit. In hiring these workers, institutional util-
ity is maximized, as better-qualified workers will work more effi-
ciently and productively. Affirmative action programs impede
this perceived efficiency. The decision to hire or admit is made
not on the qualifications at hand, or the fit between an appli-
cant's skills and the job in question, but on conditions entirely
independent of these. Affirmative action, in fact, cares less about
efficiency and productivity, but social justice and progress.
In modern times, the quintessential institutional argument
in favor of affirmative action plans is concerned with the diversi-
fication of the work force and educational institutions. Its perva-
siveness owes a great deal to Justice Powell's deciding opinion in
Bakke, where he counseled against quotas in favor of plans such
as Harvard's, where race played not a controlling role in the ad-
missions process but was considered alongside various other in-
dividual characteristics. According to Justice Powell, and to ad-
vocates of affirmative action in general, diversity is a worthy and
legitimate institutional goal - though not a constitutional man-
date-for institutions of higher education. More broadly, this ar-
gument looks to the fabric of American society and social neces-
sity in the face of the demands of an evolving multicultural
world. Amy Gutmann explains: "Were it not for the presence of
black students in universities like Princeton, students and teach-
would probably vote to scrap the entire patchwork of affirmative action measures in this
country in favor of a massive capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational
facilities. But this conclusion goes to affirmative action's costs and benefits, not to its
constitutionality.").
29. For an early analysis of the debate and its myriad issues, see Robert M. O'Neil,
Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education,
80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
30. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 132. Cf. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative
Action, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 34 (1992) ("Merely touting the successes of affirma-
tive action, of course, is to glance at only one side of the ledger. On the other side are
substantial costs. When examined in terms of both theory and practice, affirmative action
deserves a negative judgment.").
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ers alike would have far less sustained contact with significantly
different life experiences and perceptions, and correspondingly
less opportunity to develop the mutual respect that is a constitu-
tive ideal of democratic citizenship.'
' 1
Second, the debate has carried on over the social costs and
benefits of race conscious measures. The costs are many. In gen-
eral, and as posited by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion
in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey,
the use of racial classifications by the state may "stimulate our
society's latent race consciousness., 32 Critics of race conscious
decision-making argue that the use of race in any context, and
under any circumstance, is invidious per se. The overarching
goal is a colorblind society, a social condition where skin color is
irrelevant. Affirmative action plans do not lead us towards that
goal, but instead foster racial resentment 33 and divisive identity
politics.34 These measures, therefore, exact a heavy price on our
long-term social goals. For this reason, "one gets beyond racism
by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible
commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or
practices of one's government-the differential treatment of
other human beings by race. 3
31. Gutmann, supra note 26, at 127; see Trevor W. Coleman, Affirmative Action is
about people, not just numbers and grades, DET. FREE PRESS, May 29, 1997, at 14A
("You cannot run the affairs of a state or nation that is growing in ethnic diversity and
expect the victims of exclusion to accept their condition quietly. The anti-apartheid revo-
lution in South Africa proved that."); Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 18, 24; Philip L. Quinn, Affirmative Action and the Multicul-
tural Ideal, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 26, at 197;
Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990) (exalting the overall value of diversity as defended by the
Court in Metro Broadcasting).
32. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). The following year, of course, Justice Brennan dis-
played different concerns. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
33. See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984); Randall
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986) (asserting that this argument is deployed by affirmative ac-
tion critics).
34. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 855, 858 (1995). Similarly, critics argue that the categories in question are "arbi-
trary" and "absurd," as it is not entirely clear who qualifies as a beneficiary. Russell Nieli,
Ethnic Tribalism and Human Personhood, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 61; see Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.
Q. 147.
35. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Consti-
tution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979); see BICKEL, supra note 20, at 133 ("The his-
tory of the racial quota is a history of subjugation, not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its
name but in its effect; a quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the
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The social costs of race conscious policies are also measured
in more practical terms. While departing from the shared goal of
racial justice, some critical commentary argues that affirmative
action plans do not lead us towards this worthy goal but away
from it. The argument is one based on complacency, and the di-
vestment of much needed attention for the real problems afflict-
ing our nation's truly disadvantaged. In the words of one such
critic:
The tragedy is that meanwhile, a great complex of issues lies
untreated beyond affirmative action. Although these issues bear
on life's prospects and the nature of opportunity in America, our
leaders will not address them as directly as they should. These
issues concern health, safety in the streets, and education, both
academic and vocational. More attention must focus on, among
other things, improving the quality of education in all schools.
Especially deserving of improvements are those schools in which
minorities are predominant, particularly the elementary grades,
kindergarten, pre-kindergarten, and apprentice programs in
which those without adequate job skills can learn them.
This is one of the most serious charges leveled against race
conscious plans.
In response, affirmative action advocates offer two views.
First, and in direct response to the long-term argument for co-
lorblindness, affirmative action supporters share Justice Black-
mun's view that in "order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race."37 This is a corollary of the diversity ra-
worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striving for an equality that
will make race irrelevant.").
36. Eastland, supra note 30, at 50; see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Xerces and the Affirma-
tive Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1595 (1989) (arguing that instead of focus-
ing on judicial doctrines and their flaws, we must analyze the larger mechanisms that help
sustain socioeconomic status quo); Clint Bolick, Minority Preferences Hurt, Not Help,
DET. FREE PRESS, August 27, 1998, at 15A ("Preferences only delay the day of reckon-
ing, providing a superficial fix that fails to address the underlying educational inequali-
ties."); Newt Gingrich & Ward Connerly, Face the Failure of Racial Preferences, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1997 , at 15 ("The racial preferences used in their name have been used
as masks to avoid real reform. They have become an excuse to perpetuate an inner-city
system to cheat those children most in need out of a real future."). But see Brent Staples,
The Trouble with J.C. Watts, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1997, at A22 ("We shouldn't fight dis-
crimination with discrimination... but this country has not reached a level playing field.
You can't get rid of affirmative action until you have something to replace it." (quoting
U.S. Congressman J.C. Watts)).
37. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see BORIS
BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 120 (1973) ("[W]e can have a color-
blind society in the long run only if we refuse to be color-blind in the short run."); Gut-
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tionale: our society is an ever-changing pastiche of races and cul-
tures, and our institutions of higher education must prepare our
students for it. Affirmative action is thus a practical way by
which individuals of various races may come in contact with and
learn from others. Second, by placing individuals who have been
deprived of opportunities in the past in positions where they can
achieve academically, two further benefits accrue: not only will
these students move on and occupy influential leadership posi-
tions,3" but the day will come when affirmative action will no
longer be needed. On this view, affirmative action simply pro-
vides an initial opportunity, an opportunity which, with time, will
eventually be phased out, as students and workers will overcome
the institutional and social barriers standing in their way. When
this day comes, this view concludes, and only then, will the
dream of a colorblind society be truly attainable.
Third, the most serious charges directed against affirmative
action plans are those that focus on its costs to individuals. These
costs run both ways. On one end, race conscious measures stig-
matize the very same students they profess to help40 and ulti-
mately "undermin[e] [their] self-confidence.",4' Also looking to
the costs on the individuals who benefit from affirmative action
plans, commentators have further argued that "a racial quota
derogates the human dignity and individuality of all to whom it
is applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice., 42 Af-
mann, supra note 26, at 131 (arguing that anyone committed to a view of justice as fair-
ness would argue in favor of racial preferences because they "pave[ I the way for a soci-
ety in which fair equality of opportunity is a reality rather than merely an abstract prom-
ise").
38. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMIS-
SIONS (1998).
39. See Gutmann, supra note 26, at 131 ("It is reasonable to think that by hiring
qualified blacks for stereotypically white positions in greater numbers than blacks would
be hired by color blind employers, the United States will move farther and faster in the
direction of providing fair opportunity for all its citizens.").
40. Eastland, supra note 30, at 41-43; Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18; Alstyne, supra note 35, at 787 n.38 (asserting that af-
firmative action plans "unquestionably impose a racial stigma on those who benefit by
them"); see also Brest & Oshige, supra note 34, at 858 ("Remedies based on race or eth-
nicity... may stigmatize and foster antagonism toward members of the groups that they
are intended to benefit.").
41. SOWELL, supra note 33, at 118; see STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
42. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 133; see Carl Cohen, DeFunis Case: Race & the Con-
stitution, 220 NATION 135 (1975). On these terms, one may concede that the Constitution
is directly implicated. Unfortunately, both Bickel and Cohen do a poor job of defending
the invidious nature of racial preferences. And without that defense, their arguments
prove unpersuasive.
20041
144 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:133
firmative action is also unfair to innocent third parties, those in-
dividuals supposedly displaced by the admission of affirmative
action applicants into the named institution.43 Almost since the
genesis of affirmative action practices, these individuals have
fought back, and have won important battles in Court. In recent
years, federal courts have been quite friendly to these victims,
sometimes going as far as relaxing traditional doctrinal require-
ments in order to afford them their day in court.44
Two serious charges remain. First, critics charge that af-
firmative action places students in educational institutions where
they can't compete.45 While a student may perform admirably in
a state college of moderate scholastic reputation, this view ar-
gues, the same may not be said of this same student in an elite
schools, where she will have to compete with the very same stu-
dents that outperformed her academically prior to admission.
And worse yet, these programs will ultimately lead society to
take a disdainful view towards minority graduates, as they will
be viewed as less qualified, even after attaining their degrees.46
43. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that benign
racial classifications may have adverse consequences, as they may be "viewed
as unjust by many in our society, especially by those individuals who are ad-
versely affected by a given classification").
This is one of the leading objections about affirmative action plans. Without more,
this argument is not enough. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1976) ("It is a
truism-only because it is true-that a practice may be unwise or even unfair and yet not
be unconstitutional."); Rubenfeld, supra note 28, at 456 ("Affirmative action surely is
unfair to whites, sharply and deeply so.... But constitutional law is not moral philoso-
phy, and unfairness is not unconstitutionality.").
44. For a poignant example, see the Court's approach to standing in the racial dis-
tricting cases of the last ten years, where the Court appears to have relaxed standing re-
quirements in order to allow litigants to challenge the state actions in question. See Sam-
uel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights
Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:
Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 311 (1995-96) (criticizing the
Court's "inability to articulate and identify a concrete harm").
45. See STEPHAN & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICAN IN BLACK AND WHITE
(1997); Lino A. Graglia, "Affirmative Action," Past, Present, and Future, 22 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 1207, 1216 (1996); Scalia, supra note 34; Thomas Sowell, Are Quotas Good for
Blacks?, 65 COMMENTARY 39 (1978).
46. See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law
School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 571-72 (1975). But see Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that, as all admitted students must sat-
isfy the same degree requirements, all degrees are equal, whether the student benefited
from affirmative action or not).
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Advocates defend their support for affirmative action prac-
tices by pointing to the benefits of "identity role models," indi-
viduals in positions of influence who "teach black children that
they too can realistically aspire to social accomplishment., 47 The
overarching concern to which "role-model theory" is directed is
self-defeatism, the view that societal discrimination engenders
negative and pessimistic ideas about the world and one's chances
of success. Our pessimism clouds our self-judgment, and the
world around us offers little resistance; we look for those like us,
those who have braved the elements and succeeded, yet cannot
find anyone. Hence, on this view, it is beneficial for minority
children to see teachers of their own race, or for minority em-
ployees and the public at large to see members of minority
groups in managerial and other influential positions. Their mere
presence, on this rendition of "role model theory," is enough.48
From this discussion, it should be clear why the debate is
considered "boring, 49 and "steril[e]"50 by many. On its terms, it
offers little guidance, much less a dispositive argument. Dan
Farber captures the debate in a simple paragraph:
Opponents consider affirmative action to be reverse discrimi-
nation, charging that racial discrimination is equally wrong
regardless of the race of the victim. Supporters retort that the
relationship between African Americans and whites is hardly
symmetrical, and that racial preferences are necessary to rem-
edy discrimination, to provide role models for the disadvan-
taged, and to increase diversity. Opponents, in turn, attack
these arguments as normatively wrong or empirically false.
Although little new can be said about these arguments, the
dispute continues with no sign of resolution.51
When debated along these lines, the controversy is certainly
sterile. The debaters simply go around in circles, refraining fa-
miliar arguments in new and creative ways. 2 In fairness, this ob-
47. Gutmann, supra note 26, at 131-32. Seen differently, this defense also falls un-
der the "social benefits" category. Gutmann labels this view "diversity role models." In
her own words: "[Dliversity role models teach all children and adults alike that blacks
are accomplished contributors to our society from whom we may all learn." Id. at 132.
48. This justification has not fared well. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (rejecting the "role model theory" as a basis for justifying a racial
classification).
49. Rubenfeld, supra note 28, at 427.
50. Farber, supra note 27, at 894.
51. Id. at 893-94.
52. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1845 (1996)
(asserting that the debate "has gotten repetitive, and morbidly so."); Daniel A. Farber,
Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 159 (1994) (remarking
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servation applies with equal force to the federal judiciary.
Rather than elevating one policy preference over another, in the
name of the Constitution, it is clear to us that the courts should
defer these decisions to those state actors with the knowledge
and expertise in this area. That means that the courts should de-
fer to the decisions of our institutions of higher education, as
guided and controlled by their boards of regents and ultimately
by their state legislatures and their state Constitutions. This con-
clusion remains unaffected by the legal arguments made against
race conscious policies, which we examine in the next section.
B. THE JUDICIAL PARADOX
The Supreme Court joined the affirmative action debate
early on, acting under its implicit authority to protect the Four-
teenth Amendment's hopelessly indeterminate language. While
doing so, and much to the chagrin of race consciousness sup-
porters, the Supreme Court has struck down affirmative action
plans from institutions of higher education, 3 local govern-
ments, 4 and even Congress.55
In acting this way, the modern Court invites comparisons to
the Lochner era, a time when the Court actively pursued its pol-
icy aims despite scarce constitutional support.' This judicial re-
action raises interesting puzzles and conundrums. Dairy and
pulpwood industrialists, to provide a well-documented example,
can raid their legislatures and ask for legislative spoils;5 7 so can,
for that matter, optometrists and ophthalmologists. Racial mi-
norities, conversely, can not do the same. 9 The Equal Protection
that the combatants "have worn deep grooves repeating the same basic arguments and
counterarguments over and over").
53. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Hop-
wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
54. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
55. See Adarand Constructors Inc, v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
56. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term- Foreword: The Consti-
tution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30,
40 (1993) ("By tying its holdings to such reified concepts as 'content neutrality' and 'color
blindness,' the current Court threatens to repeat the errors of the most infamous of pre-
modern Courts, the Lochner Court."); id. at 102-09 (directing his argument specifically to
the race cases); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-
blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 336-37 (1997) (equating the racial gerrymandering cases
to the Lochner era).
57. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
58. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
59. This is puzzling for a number of reasons. To name a few: we understand our-
selves as members of groups, not as individuals. Perhaps we should understand ourselves
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Clause stands in the way of legislation enacted for the benefit
(and we suppose, yet skeptically,6" the invidious disadvantage) of
racial minorities.
This is an ultimately perverse paradox, especially in light of
our nation's troubled racial history. Under modern equal protec-
tion doctrine, once the Court determines that a group has been
previously disadvantaged, the government's power to help this
group is severely restricted. And in fact, when the government
does choose to act, such legislation is subject to strict review, and
is generally deemed unconstitutional. As David Strauss writes,
"[t]his cannot possibly be the right approach.",61
Four approaches are worth considering. First, go back to the
constitutional source of dispute. When the Court turns to the
Constitution, the text provides scant support: "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
as individuals, aside from our ethnic and racial ties. See Jtirgen Habermas, Multicultural-
ism and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849 (1995) (arguing that the central issue in
the race consciousness debate is whether "citizens' identities as members of ethnic, cul-
tural, or religious groups publicly matter, and, if so, how can collective identities make a
difference within the frame of a constitutional democracy?"). Yet, without more, and to
echo argument made in the previous section, this is hardly a concern of constitutional
dimensions. Further, all classifications will always hurt individuals in some respects; thus,
why are racial classifications so pernicious, in terms of winning and losing, getting in or
not, in ways that other classifications are not? See Fiss, supra note 24. To its detriment,
and ultimately our own, the Court does not say.
60. Cf. MeCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (refusing to intervene in favor of
black defendants in the face of a study that, at least at the time the Court held the case,
concluded that "defendants charged with killing whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive
a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks"); City of Memphis v. Greene,
451 U.S. 100 (1981); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971).
In this vein, Mark Strasser argues that a double standard exists for discrimination
cases, with the Court more worried about the effects of benign discrimination policies.
This double standard, he continues, will not promote the racial acceptance and harmony
that the Court claims to want." Instead, this double standard "cannot help but promote
the view that the Court does not want to rectify past injustice or even extirpate inappro-
priate views about race, but rather wants to maintain the status quo or, perhaps, the
status quo of a bygone era." Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the
Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 403
(1994); see ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (arguing that the affirmative action backlash ultimately boils
down to racism); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996).
61. David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 13; see Rubenfeld, supra note 28, at 471 ("Affirmative action, with all its costs and im-
perfections, is not inconsistent with the commitment made by this nation when it enacted
the Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, there is a reason why Congress enacted
'colored relief' legislation at the same time this commitment was laid down. The reason is
justice -constitutional justice.").
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the laws.",62 Without more, it is hard to know what to make of
this clause. 63 The text speaks of the denial of equal protection,
implicitly pointing away from a legal regime where laws are en-
forced unequally, to the detriment of disfavored persons.64 From
this language, the facts in Yick Wo, where a local statute was ap-
plied to Chinese Americans with a vengeance, but hardly ever to
whites, appear to be what the framers had in mind. 65 As a facial
matter, the equal protection clause does not speak directly to ra-
cial preferences.
A second leading argument, originalism, also helps modern
critics little. According to this interpretive method, constitu-
tional adjudication turns on the intention of the framers of the
document. While this methodology freezes constitutional mean-
ings, its proponents hail this fact as its greatest virtue.66 Under
this guideline, affirmative action plans would appear to pass con-
stitutional scrutiny. It is well documented, for example, that the
Reconstruction Congress passed a great deal of color conscious
legislation during the time it debated and drafted the 14th
Amendment.67 For those who speak in terms of racial discrimi-
nation in general, such as modern affirmative action critics, it is
clear that such an understanding of the clause is nowhere pre-
ordained. In fact, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
would draw a clear distinction between the discriminatory acts.
In other words, the clause would apply only to invidious racial
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
63. For a classic discussion of the equality principle, and the various difficulties in-
herent in its judicial application, see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBrock, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
64. Cf. West, supra note 27, at 129 (arguing that "the plainest possible meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that no state shall deny to any citizen 'equal pro-
tection of the law' is that no state may deny to any citizen the protection of its criminal
and civil law against private violence and private violation").
65. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court
struck down a racially neutral city ordinance against wooden laundry buildings enforced
almost exclusively against Chinese owners.
66. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989) ("Originalism ... establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite sepa-
rate from the preferences of the judge himself.").
67. See Rubenfeld, supra note 28; Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legis-
lative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985); Stephen A.
Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist
Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. R. 477, 556-65 (1998); see also Eric Foner, The Supreme Court's
Legal History, 23 RUTGERS L. J. 243, 247 (1992) ("If I act as an amateur legal scholar, the
Supreme Court justices act as amateur legal historians.... [Court decisions] suggest that
[the justices] have a great deal to learn about the real original purposes of the Recon-
struction Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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discriminations rather than to all classifications made along ra-
cial lines.68 As we argue below, affirmative action is invidious
neither in theory nor in practice.
A third argument takes advantage of the open-ended text.
In the words of Justice Scalia: "The ascendant school of constitu-
tional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called the
Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal statutes)
grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of
a changing society., 69 This is an interpretive tool that most con-
servative commentators and jurists view with great scorn,7° for
obvious reasons. Adherents of the "Living Constitution" view
worry about "the supremacy of the human dignity of every indi-
vidual, ' ' 71 and view the Supreme Court "as the voice and con-
science of contemporary society."" To the critics, these are but
justifications for interposing one's subjective preferences on le-
gitimate and authoritative democratic outcomes.
This position is intuitively appealing to many, especially
those distrustful of majorities. Placed in historical context, this
argument has gained much support following the advent of the
Warren Court. The pressing concern this view must address, of
course, centers on the discovery of any such values by independ-
ent federal judges. Specifically on the question of affirmative ac-
tion, for example, critics are quick to point out that public opin-
ion polls strongly suggest that most racial groups, even racial
68. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
69. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann cd., 1997);
see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976).
70. As Justice Rehnquist observed long ago, this argument places judges as "a small
group of fortunately situated people with a roving commission to second-guess Congress,
state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what is best for
the country." Rehnquist, supra note 69, at 698.
To be fair, progressives do not have proprietary rights over "living constitution" ar-
guments, and critics can now point to the Warren Court era and smile, secure in the
knowledge that the roles appear to have shifted. All we should ask is for a little more
candor; after all, as Rubenfeld writes, "they are calling on courts to render the kind of
judgment about justice (beyond the letter of the law, beyond original intent) that else-
where they deplore." Rubenfeld, supra note 28, at 432.
71. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986).
72. Quoted in Rehnquist, supra note 69, at 695; see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) ("The
function of a judge is to give concrete meaning and application to our constitutional val-
ues.").
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minorities, object to the idea of racial preferences.73 From this
apparent reality, one may plausibly argue that affirmative action
programs violate some amorphous American notion of shared
constitutional values. Paradoxically, this is a sensible way to un-
derstand the Court's long-standing derision to race-conscious
measures.
However, public opinion polls are not as definitive as critics
imply. In fact, competing accounts suggest exactly the opposite: a
strong racial divide exists on the question of affirmative action,
with blacks showing solid support for the programs, while whites
oppose them strongly.74 Therefore, these constitutional values
are not, as critics posit, universally shared after all, but judicially
imposed on the basis of personal attitudes.7" Taken in its strong-
est form, then, the "Living Constitution" also fails to offer a
much-needed argument.
A final argument focuses on the moral failings of race-
conscious practices. Interestingly, this is the leading critique,
however unacknowledged, against race conscious measures.
Critics seldom couch their criticisms in these terms, yet their ar-
guments implicitly fall under this interpretivist school. Justice
Scalia and his fellow interpretivist travelers lie closer to Ronald
Dworkin's moral constructionism than they ever acknowledge.
The argument is deceptively simple. In the words of Alex-
ander Bickel, "a racial quota derogates the human dignity and
individuality of all to whom it is applied; it is invidious in princi-
ple as well as in practice. 7 6 This is perhaps the strongest consti-
tutional attack on affirmative action. Anything that derogates a
person's dignity cannot possibly be a good thing, and it is not a
great leap to conclude that the Constitution has something to say
about it. Unfortunately, the argument goes wholly unsupported,
its truth seemingly indisputable.
Our national disdain for quotas of any kind, especially racial
ones, is well known. The nomination of Lani Guinier's to head
73. See Scalia, supra note 34; Sowell, supra note 33.
74. See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996).
75. It is hardly disputable that a Court majority dislikes race conscious measures,
and its doctrinal stance stems from this position. The law does little work for the Court
here, and attitudes drive the analysis. For a general rendition of the attitudinalist view,
see JEFFREY ALLAN SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
76. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 133; see Cohen, supra note 42.
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the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division provides an un-
fortunate example. In a world dominated by sound bites, her op-
ponents were quick to brand her, if undeservedly, as "a quota
queen."77 The label stuck, and her nomination was soon with-
drawn. Interestingly, while the label stuck, arguments against
quotas themselves were seldom, if ever, made public.
The same goes for affirmative action programs. Essentially,
critics present an argument against race consciousness (and im-
plicitly against quotas) grounded on interrelated notions of
merit, discrimination, and innocent victimhood. The basic argu-
ment runs like this: schools make admission decisions based
mostly on grades and aptitude test scores, and those with better
quantitative qualifications deserve admission. When students in
the applicant pool are compared against one another, or when
seats are set aside for race conscious purposes, some students
with inferior qualifications are still offered admissions, thanks in
great part, if not solely, to preferences accorded on the basis of
race. Those hypothetical students, who would have been offered
admission but for the affirmative action program, are discrimi-
nated against, innocent victims of social engineering practices.78
This argument ultimately tries to prove too much. For ex-
ample, the most damning charge against affirmative action poli-
cies is the notion of merit. As the critics present their case, merit
must determine the disbursement of seats to our prestigious pub-
77. See Stephen Carter, Foreword, in LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY vii (1994).
78. This view is exemplified by Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, a Title VII case:
the only losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country, for whom Title
VII has been not merely repealed but actually inverted. The irony is that these
individuals - predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized - suffer this
injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champion of the po-
litically impotent.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While
Scalia's views were voiced in a dissenting opinion, we have little doubt that today they
carry a majority of the Court. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n.12
(1980) (Stewart J., dissenting) (arguing that innocent white workers should not be made
to pay "for the sins of others of their own race"); Roger Pilon, Discrimination, Affirma-
tive Action, and Freedom: Sorting Out the Issues, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 789 (1996). But
see RONALD J. FiscuS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1992) (disagreeing with this characterization of victimhood, since
minorities would have had a larger proportion of society's goods in a nonracist environ-
ment, which the real world is not); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Diversity, Multicultural-
ism, and Affirmative Action: Duke, the NAS, and Apartheid, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1141
(1992) (explaining that affirmative action is necessary to redress past hiring practices, and
is not unfair to "innocent" whites); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43
VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990) (defending the position that arguments about "innocent white
victims" are grounded on racist ideology).
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lic institutions. Few would argue this point. "Merit" must cer-
tainly determine how precious positions in higher education in-
stitutions must be allotted. The crux of the argument is in defin-
ing exactly what merit entails. Constructed narrowly, scholastic
merit is a matter easily quantified, and gauged simply by grades
and aptitude test scores. 9 Higher test scorers are consequently
seen as deserving of their seats. A critique of this narrow view is
easy.8° A more expansive definition would encompass various
79. See Ellia Cose, The Color Bind, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1997, at 58, 59; see, e.g.,
Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1312, 1322 (1986). And yet, even Douglas' dissent in DeFunis, while abhorring ra-
cial classifications of any kind, is still willing to leave the matter of qualifications to the
discretion of school administrators. This results from his skepticism about the value of
the criteria traditionally used, and their impact on minority students. See DcFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320. One of the nation's foremost opponents of affirmative ac-
tion agrees. Ward Connerly, the infamous University of California regent, says it is "ab-
surd" for schools to rely on grades and test scores alone. Julian E. Barnes, A Surprising
Turn on Minority Enrollment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 29, 1997, at 34. For a
recent study on the LSAT and its predictive value, see William D. Henderson, The
LSA T, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of
Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975 (2004).
80. Amy Gutmann argues, for example, that simply because someone qualifies for a
given position does not mean that they merit it. See Gutmann, supra note 26, at 119. Spe-
cifically in the case of higher education, for example, many individuals qualify for a seat
in an entering class. The ultimate decision as to the admission itself must follow from the
qualifications in question, but not automatically. Injustice does not follow from selecting
a given candidate from a pool of qualified applicants. As long as the stated qualifications
are met, applicants who fail to gain admittance may not claim that the process has treated
them unjustly. If it were otherwise, as Gutmann explains, society "would ... [be] hostage
to the job preferences of qualified people." Id. at 120.
For a sampling of the many criticisms of the merit principle, see BARBARA R.
BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 102-06 (1996); Dworkin, supra note
5; PHILIP GREEN, THE PURSUIT OF INEQUALITY 168-76 (1981); CHARLES R. LAWRENCE
III AND MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 91-111 (1997); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative
Action, the Family, and the Dream that is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1123
(1996) ("[M]erit and fairness arc deployed in ways that mask the real issues, white enti-
tlement and patriarchy."); Erwin Chcmerinsky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 22 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1159, 1172 (1996) (explaining that "'merit' must include all
that makes a person deserving of entrance. Because the importance of diversity, merit
often should include what a person will add to the education of other students"); Gut-
mann, supra note 26 at 106; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1707, 1766-77 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007,
2052 (1991) (arguing that meritocratic standards are a "gate built by a white male he-
gemony that requires a password in the white man's voice for passage"); Kenneth L.
Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV.
955, 962 (1974); Kennedy, supra note 33, at 1322-23, 1333 n.20; John Morrison, Color-
blindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Ac-
tion, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994); Yxta Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.0. 1073 (1996); Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the
Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995) (criticizing merit and effi-
ciency, and specifically the weak predictive strength of tests in the employment context);
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other criteria, including whatever obstacles a student overcame
throughout her educational life, life and educational opportuni-
ties, the performance of extracurricular work, and even race.8' A
resolution of this debate over merit in particular, and affirmative
action in general, seems nowhere in sight.8 2
Furthermore, critics of racial preferences couch their
strongest objections in the universally-derided language of dis-
crimination. The concern here is not about invidious discrimina-
tion as commonly understood,83 where members of the majority
race purposefully degrade those in the minority, but rather dis-
crimination against whites. On this view, race conscious policies
are a form of reverse discrimination against those persons who
are kept from receiving deserved benefits. In the words of a
Michigan state legislator, referring to the University of Michi-
gan's affirmative action policy: "[w]e believe that discrimination
is widespread and the discrimination is so blatant, that it would
be an easy case to win in a court of law."'84 Yet how exactly are
cf. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83
CAL. L. REV. 853 (1995) with Frank Wu, From Black and White and Back Again, 3
ASIAN L.J. 185, 215 (1996) (arguing that Sherry and Farber's "radical critique of merit" is
a straw man).
81. See also Karst &. Horowitz, supra note 80, at 967 (defining individual merit as
the "selection of attributes common to a group [ ] according to a perception of social
needs"); Murray, supra note 80, at 1075 (arguing for the concept of merit teaching, which
the author defines as "the expansion of our current definition of merit to include the con-
tributions of previously silenced voices").
82. The Supreme Court has provided conflicting messages on this issue, at least in
the context of employment practices. On the one hand, the Court has approved affirma-
tive action plans whenever specific instances of discrimination by government, unions, or
employers can be established. Conversely, the Court has also held that governmental
entities may not attempt to remedy prior employment discrimination through race con-
scious layoffs because the burden on innocent victims is too heavy. See Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 43, at 6 ("[Tlhc antidiscrimination principle disfavors
race-dependent decisions and conduct - at least when they selectively disadvantage the
members of a minority group.").
84. John A. Woods, Lawmakers Attack U-M Admissions, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS,
May 2, 1997, at Al (quoting Michigan state representative Deborah Whyman). Months
later, she reiterated this view: "Many parents pay taxes to fund an educational establish-
ment that may discriminate against their children in admissions or employment." Deb-
orah Whyman, The Courage to Reform Affirmative Action, DET. NEWS, July 14, 1998, at
6A. From her position, notice how little we know: discrimination is bad, and schools must
stop discriminating among applicants. To be fair, she is only concerned with racial dis-
criminations of any kind, a position she equates to a "constitutional right." Id.
And yet, right after she writes that schools discriminate on a racial basis, she tells us
that she "find[s] this extremely unfair," and that this "was the main reason for [her]
amendment [to the state education budget, prohibiting the use of race during the college
admission process]." Id. As long as we are debating the policy wisdom of affirmative ac-
tion practices, we commend Rep. Whyman for acting on the strength of her moral con-
victions. Once she turns her attention to the Constitution, she might still be correct, but
154 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:133
race conscious policies discriminatory in a constitutionally rele-
vant sense?
Here's an easy hypothetical for higher education: as the
founder of a major university, you have twenty open seats for
the incoming medical school class. As it happens, you receive
over one hundred applications for the twenty spots. Under what
basis do you assign your scarce medical school seats? You may
decide to award ten of your seats in the incoming class to tall
people; or brown eyed people; or those living in Appalachia; or
foreign citizens, or Long Islanders, to compensate for their rug-
ged, unhealthy existence in such unforgiving parts of the world;
or to Latinos. Of those who don't get accepted by the university,
many have a better record than these ten students who have
been accepted. How is the your policy discriminatory in any
way? What's the discrimination, exactly?85 Any policy the uni-
versity adopts will discriminate.86 Going strictly by LSAT's and
GPA's discriminates against those with bad grades or LSAT
scores, or those who simply test badly, or those who do not test
well under timed conditions.87 We don't mean to be unduly flip
about this position; upon reflection, this point is hardly as outra-
she fails to proffer an argument to support her position.
85. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 109 ("[N]ot all discriminations can be prohibited: the
word 'to discriminate,' once divested of its emotional connotation, simply means to dis-
tinguish or to draw a line."); cf. Gutmann, supra note 26, at 126 ("Nondiscrimination
means that equal consideration should be given to all qualified candidates so that candi-
dates are chosen on the basis of their qualifications, where qualifications are set that are
relevant to the legitimate socialpurposes of the position in question.") (enphasis added).
86. Thus, to argue that racial quotas bring "a cost in injustice," without more,
makes little sense. BICKEL, supra note 20, at 132; see AARON B. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING
TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 239 (1979) ("positive
discrimination is fundamentally wrong"). Michael Levin, Negative Liberty, in LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY 84 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985)
(equating benign with invidious discrimination). All criteria discriminate in one way or
another. The question instead centers around the justifications for using certain criteria
over others. Race, in and of itself, is not any better or any worse than some of the criteria
currently used. Affirmative action critics need an argument, not conclusions. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 395 (1986) ("[l]f race were a banned category be-
cause people cannot choose their race, then intelligence, geographical background, and
physical ability would have to be banned as well."); PETER KNAPP ET AL., THE ASSAULT
ON EQUALITY 150 (1996) (complaining about the "massive affirmative action programs
for the privileged," e.g., "preferential admissions for alumni children, graduates of elite
prep schools, and old-boy networks of contacts which make information about a job or
school available - both in education and in business"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making
Sense of the Affirmative Action Debate, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (1996) (explain-
ing that LSATs and grades often fail to predict a great deal, yet pass for standard ac-
counts of objective merit).
87. See Henderson, supra note 79.
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geous as it might first seem. Compare, for example, the argu-
ment posited by Karst and Horowitz:
Whether "merit" be defined in terms of demonstrated achieve-
ment or of potential achievement, it includes a large and hard-to-
isolate ingredient of native talents. These talents resemble race in
that they are beyond the control of the individual whose "merit"
is being evaluated. If racial classifications are "suspect" partly for
this reason, then it may be appropriate to insist that public re-
wards for native talents be justified by a showing of compelling
necessity. 8
8
Basing admission decisions on high-test scorers, for exam-
ple, must be justified in some way, if the discrimination argu-
ment is to be considered at all. We accept certain discrimina-
tions, under the guise of merits and "proper standards," yet not
others. Are these accepted discriminations intended to reward
those with the best records? Or are they simply predictors of fu-
ture success? If seen as rewards, then rewards and punishments
may be handed out for a number of different reasons aside from
the ones presently used. Notions of just desert are not self-
evident to all, especially those at the bottom of the societal hier-
archy, those shut out from the admission process. And if predic-
tors of future success, well, why not simply use the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator, which purports to assess our personal strengths
and styles, or a battery of aptitude tests, which may measure the
type of employment for which individuals are best suited? These
are not easy questions.89
To the charge that university officials discriminate against
certain applicants on the basis of race, then, the counter argu-
ment is too obvious: schools discriminate, must discriminate, on
a number of different predetermined criteria. These criteria vary
from one institution to the next, to be sure, but all schools take a
diverse number of criteria into account. Therefore, an argument
88. Karst &. Horowitz, supra note 80, at 962. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra
note 80, at 104-05; Richard Wasserstrom, The University and the Case for Preferential
Treatment, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: WOMEN AND RACIAL
MINORITIES IN EDUCATION AND BUSINESS 16, 19-25 (William T. Blackstone & Robert
D. Heslop eds., 1977).
89. Such difficulties, in fact, may lead one to conclude that we should select people
on a strictly random basis, by way of a lottery. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Conceivably, an admissions committee might con-
clude that a selection by lot of, say, the last 20 seats is the only fair solution [to the prob-
lem raised by racial preferences in the context of college admissions]"); Lani Guinier,
The Real Bias in Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A19 ("One alternative
is for schools to set a minimum test score as acceptable and then hold what is in effect a
lottery for admission among the applicants who meet the minimum standard.").
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positing the reasons why schools may discriminate on all these
other issues, but not on a racial basis, is necessary. The critics
seldom offer one.
II. GRUTTER AND DEFERENCE
This Part situates the Court's recent decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the law school affirmative action case, within the con-
text of race consciousness as a question of social policy, not con-
stitutional law. This Part analyzes the Court's decision in Grutter
and explains why the decision proved surprising in many ways.
In the end, it ultimately defends the Court's holding of deference
as proper within the context of admissions to educational institu-
tions.
A. THE APPLICATION OF DEFERENCE
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court concluded that
the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action pro-
gram did not violate the Constitution.90 The Law School had ar-
gued that race-conscious admissions were necessary to achieve
student body diversity and to attain a "critical mass" of students
of color.9' The central questions in the case of course were
whether diversity is a compelling state interest and if so, whether
the Law School's use of race was narrowly-tailored.
In resolving the issue of the centrality of race-conscious ad-
missions to the University's educational mission, the Court
stated that the "Law School's educational judgment that... [ra-
cial] diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer."92 The Court offered two justifications to sup-
port its decision to defer to the Law School's statement that di-
versity is necessary to its educational mission. First, the Court re-
lied upon the "long recognized" tradition of academic freedom.
As Justice O'Connor stated, "given the important purpose of
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." 93 Conse-
quently, universities have a right, grounded in notions of aca-
90. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
91. Id. at 329.
92. Id. at 328.
93. Id. at 329.
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demic freedom and freedom of speech and association, to define
and implement their mission.
The Court nevertheless had to determine whether the Law
School had a compelling need for attaining a diverse student
body. The Court had no difficulty concluding that "attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission. 9 4 Moreover, the Court was quick to rec-
ognize that whether racial diversity is important to the educa-
tional mission of a law school or university involves "complex
educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university."9'
Second, the Court was also persuaded by the evidenced
amassed by the Law School that racial diversity is important to
the educational mission of a university.96 The Court maintained
that the benefits of racial diversity "are substantial. 9 7 They in-
clude the promotion of cross-racial understandings, the dissolu-
tion of racial stereotypes, and the intellectual exchanges that are
the result of a having classroom discussions that are informed by
individuals of a "variety of backgrounds." 98
The Law School's assertions were supplemented by sup-
porters who confirmed the benefits of racial diversity that were
advanced by the Law School and who propounded additional
benefits of racial diversity. For example, "major American busi-
nesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increas-
ingly global marketplace can only be developed through expo-
sure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." 99
Further, "high-ranking retired offices and civilian leaders of the
United States military" have testified to the importance of racial
diversity in higher education to the mission of the armed
forces.°
In view of all of this evidence, the Court held that the Law
School's justification for its raceconscious admissions process
was compelling and that the Law School's judgment on its edu-
cational mission was worthy of deference in the absence of a lack
94. Id.
95. Id. at 328.
96. Id. ("The Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational
benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici.").
97. Id. at 330.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 308.
100. Id.at331.
2004]
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:133
of "'good faith' on the part of [the] university," which is "'pre-
sumed"' unless there is "'a showing to the contrary. ' ' 1°
With respect to the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny,
the Court delineated three factors that are relevant to success-
fully traverse the narrow tailoring analysis. First, a university
cannot use a quota system102 or use race in a mechanical and in-
flexible manner.10 3 Second, the process must guarantee that each
applicant is subject to individualized consideration. 4 Individual-
ized consideration means that each applicant must have the op-
portunity to meet the stated criterion and that the university
"cannot insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic
groups from the competition for admission."' 05 Third, race can-
not be "the defining feature" of the application process. °6 If di-
versity is the relevant evaluative criterion, "all factors that con-
tribute to student body diversity [must be] ... meaningfully
considered alongside race in admission decisions."'0 7 Put differ-
ently, while race may be on the menu, it cannot be the main
course and it certainly cannot be the only offering on the menu.
The Court concluded that the Law School did not violate
any of these three elements of the narrow-tailoring analysis.
First, while the Law School expressed a goal of attaining a criti-
cal mass of underrepresented students of color, the Court re-
solved that this goal-which required the law school to be con-
scious of the race of individuals in its applicant pool, the race of
the individuals to whom it extended offers, and the race of the
individuals who accepted the Law School's offer of admissions-
was not the functional equivalent of a quota. The Court rea-
soned that to the extent that attaining a critical mass of under-
represented students of color was a legitimate goal-which the
Court concluded that it was if achieving student diversity was a
compelling interest-the school is entitled to pay "[s]ome atten-
tion to numbers" and the "relationship between numbers and
101. Id.at 343.
102. Id. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admission program can-
not use a quota system.").
103. Id. (noting that a "truly individualized consideration demands that race be used
in a flexible, nonmechanical way"); see also id. at 337.
104. Id. at 336-37 ("When using race.., in university admissions, a university's ad-
missions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated
as an individual.").
105. Id. at 334.
106. Id. at 337.
107. Id. at 337.
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achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body,
and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment
for those students admitted."'0 8
The Court also concluded that the Law School treated each
applicant as an individual. Each applicant is evaluated on the ba-
sis of their ability to contribute to relevant criteria including di-
versity.'°9 Moreover, the Law School's evaluation of the appli-
cant's diversity is not limited to racial diversity but also included
geographic diversity among other diversity considerations. °" 0
Having navigated these shoals successfully, the Law School's
program was deemed worthy of the Court's blessings.
B. GRUTTER'S DEFERENCE AS DIVERGENT
The Court's decision in Grutter to defer to the judgment of
the administrators at the University of Michigan that attaining
racial diversity is a compelling state interest and the Court's ap-
plication of strict scrutiny was surprising for a number of rea-
sons. First, the Court's prior modern precedents had interpreted
the Equal Protection Clause in an extremely formalistic manner
to severely narrow the ability of state actors to engage in race-
based decisionmaking. Prior to Grutter, strict scrutiny appeared
to serve as a talismanic incantation whose very utterance por-
tended its dire consequences."' Thus, the phrase made famous
by the late Gerald Gunther that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory
but fatal in fact.""' 2 "With the possible exception of Easley v.
Cromartie,"3 the Court had never sustained a racial classification
against an equal protection challenge and the application of
strict scrutiny."'"14 Strict scrutiny as a concept and as constitu-
tional analysis was characterized-erroneously as we shall argue
below-as a mechanical and wooden test that simply meant un-
constitutional.
Second, the Court had taken great pains to stress the neces-
sity and importance of judicial review of state classifications on
108. Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 337.
110. Id. at 338.
111. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 476 U.S. 216,220 & n.6 (1984).
112. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
113. 532 U.S. 234,237(2001).
114. Guy-Uricl E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness From the Original
Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009, 2010 (2004).
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the basis of race. The Court articulated two general values vindi-
cated by judicial review. The first value reflected the Court's
skepticism that state actors can deploy carefully the explosive
devices that are racial classifications. For example in City of
Richmond v. Croson,"5 the Court through Justice O'Connor
stated that the purpose of searching judicial scrutiny is to
"'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legisla-
tive body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of
a highly suspect tool.""' Similarly, in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena,"7 again in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
stated that "any person, of whatever race, has the right to de-
mand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."'"1 8 The Court
went on to note that "all governmental action based on race...
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been in-
fringed."" 9 Strict scrutiny assured that "a government classifica-
tion based on race, which 'so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis
for disparate treatment,' is legitimate, before permitting unequal
treatment based on race."'
2 0
The second value underscores the Court's concern that ra-
cial classifications "carry the danger of stigmatic harm." Racial
classifications may "promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility."' 2' Similarly, in Shaw v. Reno,
the Court stated that "classifications of citizens solely on the ba-
sis of race... threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of
their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostil-
ity.' 22 Because of those dangers, the Court has sought to evalu-
ate strictly state action that involves racial categorizations. As
the Court stated in Croson, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based measures, there is sim-
ply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
115. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
116. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
117. 515 U.S. 200 (1985).
118. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
119. Id. at 227.
120. Id. at 228.
121. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
122. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
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'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by ille-
gitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
123
The Court's decision to defer to the University in Grutter
may have been surprising for at least a third reason. Because the
Court distrusted the state's judgment in using racial classifica-
tions, the Court had steadily narrowed the available justifica-
tions for state action on the basis of race. In Bakke, Justice Pow-
ell argued that remedying societal discrimination was not a
compelling state interest. 121 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
1251 or
cation, the Court concluded that providing teachers as role
models for students of color could not justify state action on the
basis of race.
1 26
In the post-Bakke world one could count on two justifica-
tions for racial categorization by the state: remedying past dis-
crimination and the diversity rationale. Following Bakke, many
justices in both Croson and Adarand raised questions as to the
continued validity of both rationales. For example in Croson,
Justice O'Connor remarked that racial classifications exact se-
vere constitutional costs "[u]nless they are strictlyreserved for
remedial settings. '' 127 This is a statement that must be under-
stood from the context of Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,,
28
where she maintained, "[u]nder... strict scrutiny, only a com-
pelling interest may support the Government's use of racial clas-
sifications. Modern equal protection has recognized only one in-
terest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The
interest in increasing diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly
not a compelling interest."' ' Instructively, Justice O'Connor
went on to exclaim:
[T]he interest in diversity of viewpoints provides no legiti-
mate, much less important, reason to employ race classifica-
tions apart from generalizations impermissibly equating race
with thoughts and behavior. And it will prove impossible to
distinguish naked preferences for members of particular races
from preferences for members of particular races because
they possess certain valued views: No matter what is purpose,
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
124. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-310 (1978).
125. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
126. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76.
127. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
128. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
129. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the Government will be able to claim that it has favored cer-
tain persons for their ability, stemming from race, to contrib-
ute distinctive views or perspectives.
In Croson, Justice Scalia maintained emphatically that race-
conscious state action is always unconstitutional except in one
circumstance. As he argued, the state can only use racial catego-
ries when "necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a
system of unlawful racial classification.""13 In Adarand, Justice
Scalia advanced this position even more forcefully. He stated:
In my view, government can never have a "compelling inter-
est" in discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make
up" for past discrimination in the opposite direction. Indi-
viduals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimina-
tion should be made whole; but under our Constitution there
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debor race....
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produce
race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.
While Justice Scalia's vision-as depicted in Croson and
Adarand-was more aspirational that actual and more norma-
tive than descriptive, he nevertheless articulated what was
widely perceived to be the inexorable direction of the Court's
race jurisprudence. Indeed, so clear was the trend line of the
Court's race doctrine that the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v.
Texas 32 struck down the University of Texas Law School's af-
firmative action program on the ground that diversity is not a
compelling state interest.'33 That court stated, "we see the case-
law as sufficiently established that the use of ethnic diversity
simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the con-
sideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional. Were we to
decide otherwise, we would contravene precedent that we are
not authorized to challenge.'
34
The Hopwood court was being of course disingenuous and
overly dramatic. There was no clearly established case law; the
130. Id. at 615-16.
131. Croson, 488 U.S. at 524.
132. 78 F.3d 932 (5thCir. 1996).
133. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
134. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46.
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Supreme Court had not held that diversity is not a compelling
state interest. No lower court had held that diversity is not a
compelling state interest. In fact, Hopwood was the first case to
so hold. Thus, there was no precedent to challenge. However,
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood was clearly anticipating and ex-
trapolating from what was reasonably assumed to be the evident
trend of the Court's racial jurisprudence and undoubtedly prod-
ding it along.
C. GRUTTER'S CONVERGENCE: AN INTERNAL DEFENSE
OF GRUTTER'S DEFERENCE
From this perspective, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas and Kennedy understandably decried the Court's deci-
sion to defer to the judgment of university administrators on the
propriety of raceconsciousness in admissions. Grutter's defer-
ence is inconsistent with the presumed formalistic application of
strict scrutiny that was characteristic of the Court's race deci-
sions. Deference is incompatible with the judicial skepticism, if
not downright hostility, that invariably confronted the state's
limited justifications for creating racial classifications. Deference
is also inconsistent with the general tenor of the Court's juris-
prudence, which was to eliminate ultimately-and not sanc-
tion-state action on the basis of race.
Nevertheless, is the Court's decision to defer to the judg-
ment of university officials in Grutter defensible? In this subpart
we offer an internal defense of the Court's decision. We argue
that the Court's decision can be defended on doctrinal grounds.
Our central point here is that the primary complaint against the
Court's decision in Grutter--that the Court's deference to the
State and its application of strict scrutiny are inconsistent with
the Court's prior precedents-elides divergent impulses in the
Court's doctrine. One must view Grutter not as representing a
radical departure from the Court's race jurisprudence, but as the
d6nouement of an epic battle within the Court on the proper
constitutional posture regarding state action on the basis of race
that is intended to benefit some citizens of color.1
35
Consider this point from another perspective. As we explain
below, one consequence of Grutter is that strict scrutiny has be-
come a functional-in contrast to a mechanical-inquiry. 3 6 Note
135. This question is thoughtfully analyzed in Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004).
136. For a wonderful analysis of this issue see Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict
2004]
164 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:133
that a functional inquiry comes closer to the sliding scale model
of scrutiny advanced by Justice Thurgood Marshall' 7 or the con-
tinuum model advanced by Justice Stevens.1
38
One might defend this move on the ground that a functional
inquiry is necessary to meet the moral claim that affirmative ac-
tion makes upon the Constitution. Thus Justice O'Connor ex-
plains in Grutter that affirmative action is necessitated "[b]y vir-
tue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality."' 3 9 Moreover,
"[iln order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity."Note also that Justice O'Connor's justification for
a more flexible application of strict scrutiny mirrors a similar jus-
tification offered by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Croson.,
40
These are not new debates and Justice O'Connor's move in
Grutter is not a radically novel move. To support this argument
we advance three specific points.
First, while the Court has never held that diversity is not a
compelling interest, at least one member of the Court other than
Justice Powell had concluded that diversity was a compelling
state interest. Specifically, in her concurring opinion in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,4' Justice O'Connor set out to ex-
plain what she perceived to be the Court's doctrine or approach
to state action on the basis of race. 42 She stated that one area of
"consensus," "although its precise contours are uncertain," was
that "a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has
been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of
higher education, to support the use of racial considerations in
furthering that interest.' 4 1 Moreover, she explained that nothing
in the plurality's decision in Wygant "necessarily foreclose[d] the
possibility that the Court will find other governmental interests
which have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have
not been passed on here [before the Supreme Court] to be suffi-
Scrutiny in Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1941 (2004).
137. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
138. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976).
139. Id. at 338.
140. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,552 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
141. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
142. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286-87.
143. Id. at 286.
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ciently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the use of affirma-
tive action policies." 1" Thus, at least as far as Justice O'Connor
understood the Court's doctrine in Wygant, one of the "core
principles"'l45 of that doctrine, which enjoyed "a fair measure of
consensus,"1 46 was that racial diversity in the context of higher
education is a compelling state interest.
Hence, the Court's statement in Grutter that the "Law
School's education judgment that .. . diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer,"'' 47 can be inter-
preted as deference not simply to the University but deference
to the Court's prior precedents. From this perspective, one can
interpret the Court as acknowledging its prior precedents that
state universities have a compelling interest in using race to
achieve a diverse student body because the Court already settled
the question of the importance of racial diversity to educational
institutions.' 48 One can also interpret the Court as admitting that
the issue of whether universities can determine what is or what is
not within its essential to its educational mission has already
been settled in favor of the universities. 49 In any event, defer-
ence does not arise ex nihilo, but is influenced by the Court's
prior statements.
Second, the Court had remarked previously that strict scru-
tiny did not herald fatal scrutiny. For example, in Adarand, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated for three other Justices, "we wish to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in
fact."' 50 Though state action on the basis of race is highly sus-
pect, the "unhappy persistence of both the practice and lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality and government is not disquali-
fied from acting in response to it." Thus, "[w]hen race-based ac-
tion is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
144. Id. at 287.
145. Id. at 287.
146. Id. at 286.
147. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
148. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) ("The
atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of
higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. [lit is
not too much to say that the 'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this nation of many peoples.").
149. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits.").
150. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailor-
ing test this Court has set out in previous cases."15' Significantly,
in United States v. Virginia, 1 2 in an opinion for the Court, Justice
Ginsburg noted this development as reflecting a change in the
Court's doctrine.' Consequently, when Justice O'Connor stated
in Grutter that "[s]trict scrutiny is not strict in theory but fatal in
fact,"' 54 her statement as much acknowledged the Court's doc-
trine as it created it.
Grutter clarified -a clarification perhaps best appreciated in
hindsight--that the concept of strict scrutiny as a mechanical and
wooden test, which indicated the genesis as well as culmination
of the constitutional inquiry, was misconstrued. Following Grut-
ter, it is now more apparent that strict scrutiny is a more flexible
and functional inquiry. Race-based actions are subject to strict
scrutiny, which means that the state must offer justifications and
the Court must examine them to ascertain whether they are
compelling and necessary to achieve the stated ends. This is an
inquiry in which state justifications are welcomed, accepted, and
considered-as opposed to rejected routinely as out of turn.' 5
This understanding of strict scrutiny as teleological and
functional makes sense of the Court's prior statements that the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to distinguish permissible from im-
permissible bases for state action on the basis of race.'56 More-
over, a functional inquiry will lead to different results from a
mechanical and pre-ordained inquiry. For example in Croson, "'
Justice O'Connor stated that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to
determine whether racial classifications are "motivated by ille-
gitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." If
one is to indeed employ this standard-as it is now clear that one
must at least employ something resembling this standard-and
apply it to Grutter, the outcome in Grutter becomes apparent
and even defensible. While one may vigorously disagree with the
use of race by the state in admissions, while one may believe that
the message communicated by the use of race in admissions is
151. Id.
152. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
153. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 & n.6.
154. Grutter, 539 U.S. 326-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 327 (noting that "strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the gov-
ernmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context").
156. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-28; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
157. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989).
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one of racial inferiority, less plausible is the contention that the
state is motivated by racial inferiority or by racial politics. The
most plausible explanation for affirmative action in higher edu-
cation is the contention that the state is attempting to provide
opportunities for some students of color who are the victims of
transgenerational past and present racial as well as socio-
economic inequalities."' Thus, even an ardent foe of affirmative
action such as Justice Thomas can express "sympathies" "in
some respect" for the state's motivations.
To the extent that strict scrutiny is a functional inquiry and
to the extent that the inquiry is premised on rooting out imper-
missible motives such as those outlined in Croson, the likelihood
that affirmative action programs will pass strict scrutiny-
provided that they are "narrowly tailored"-is quite high. What
this point demonstrates is that Grutter is not at all aberrational.
Indeed, Grutter is a product of the Court's doctrinal framework.
Third, not only is the Court's exercise of deference in Grut-
ter not inconsistent with the Court's prior cases that apply strict
scrutiny to race-conscious state action, one could argue that
Grutter very much follows from the Court's understanding of
what narrow tailoring means with respect to state action on the
basis of race. In regards to the Court's affirmative action juris-
prudence, the Court's application of the narrow-tailoring prong
of strict scrutiny has always been stricter when the state dis-
penses benefits on the basis of inflexible racial categories de-
signed to favor people of color. Conversely, the Court's applica-
tion of strict scrutiny has been less strict when the state's use of
racial categories is sufficiently malleable that individuals, in ad-
dition to people of color, are eligible for the benefits dispensed
by the state.
Take Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 160 which gave rise
to the diversity rationale. Justice Powell argued that the constitu-
tional deficiency with the University of Davis Medical School's
affirmative action program was that it "focused solely on ethnic
diversity.' 6' Justice Powell went on to note that the "diversity
that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial
158. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black
Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939,955-58 (1997).
159. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part)
160. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
161. Id. at 315.
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or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.' ' 162 Jus-
tice Powell then contrasted the Davis affirmative action program
with the Harvard affirmative action program. 63 As he remarked,
famously, in the Harvard program, "race or ethnic background
may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does
not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candi-
dates for the available seats."' Even though Harvard's affirma-
tive action program categorized on the basis of race, it was suffi-
ciently flexible-unlike the one at Davis-that it permitted all
applicants, irrespective of their race or ethnicity, to be eligible
for the state benefit-admissions to the University. 1
65
For Justice Powell, the constitutional command that gov-
ernment treats citizens as individuals and not as members of ra-
cial groups16 is operationalized-as a definitional matter-by
the requirement that the government can only use race as one
factor among many. Individualized determination implies a
process by which individuals are able to compete for state bene-
fits and make a case for themselves that they are eligible to re-
ceive the benefit in question in light of the state's stated crite-
ria167
Justice Powell's framework for addressing the limits of state
action on the basis of race has been employed by the Court in
subsequent cases. For example in Croson, the case dealing with
Richmond's 30% subcontracting set-aside for preferred subcon-
tractors of color, Justice O'Connor explained that the constitu-
tional infirmity with Richmond's is that it
denie[d] certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a
fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their
162. Id. at315.
163. Id. at 316-17.
164. Id. at 317.
165. Justice Powell explained:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his potential con-
tribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared,
for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the
latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educa-
tional pluralism .... In short, an admissions program operated in this way is
flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the par-
ticular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing
for consideration, although not necessarily the same weight.
Id.
166. Id. at 289 ("It is settled beyond question that the rights created by the first sec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.") (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 318.
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race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their
"personal right" to be treated with equal dignity and respect
are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole crite-
rion in an aspect of public decisionmaking1
68
Similarly, in the racial gerrymandering case of Miller v. John-
son,169 the Court held that while the state may be aware of race
when it draws districting lines, the state only violates the violates
the Constitution when "race was the predominant factor moti-
vating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular district."' 70 However, when
the state considers race along with a number of other race-
neutral factors such as compactness, contiguity, the maintenance
of political subdivisions, the state does not run afoul of the Con-
stitution.
Consider here Easley v. Cromartie, 171 another racial gerry-
mandering case. In Easley, and in the face of clear evidence that
the state was influenced in part by racial factors, the Court con-
cluded that race did not predominate in the drawing of the con-
gressional district in question because race was considered along
with a host of other factors including political considerations
"coupled with traditional, nonracial districting considera-
tions.' ' 72 The Court's racial gerrymandering cases, including
Easley, as well as its affirmative action cases exemplify the
framework laid out by Justice Powell in Bakke: when the state
uses rigid racial categories that only benefit people of color, the
Court does not defer to the state's purpose and strict scrutiny
tends to be rather strict.'73 But where the state shows flexibility
and uses race among various other considerations, the Court has
tended to provide the state with the benefit of the doubt and to
apply less than fatal review. Thus, Grutter is not persuasively
open to the charge that the Court discarded its prior precedents
in failing to apply strict scrutiny as fatal scrutiny to the state's ra-
cial classification.
168. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
169. 515 U.S. 900 (1994).
170. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
171. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
172. Easley, 532 U.S. at 257.
173. See Gratz v. Bollingcr, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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CONCLUSION
This essay does not take a position about the wisdom or
moral failings of race conscious programs. We join those who ar-
gue that the use of race in public policymaking is a moral ques-
tion. More specifically, decisions about the composition of an in-
coming university class are multifaceted and necessarily involve
myriad factors and judgments, moral and otherwise. These are
also policy decisions of the highest order. We argue that this is a
role for which our universities are well suited. Absent a showing
of bad faith,'74 universities must be trusted to make these diffi-
cult choices. This is not to say that universities retain unbounded
and unlimited authority in this area, as change in admissions
policies may be exacted through the legislature or the boards of
regents, or through the initiative process. From all of these
choices, it is clear to us that the courts' role must be concomi-
tantly diminished.
In taking this view, we find company with the Supreme
Court's Grutter opinion, as the Court grounded its holding on a
view of deference to institutions of higher education as well as
deference to its prior decisions. We agree with the Court on this
point, and also agree that the Court's prior decisions do not
foreclose its ultimate holding. While somewhat surprised by the
opinion, we believe that race conscious decision making is one of
those areas for which " Nudges have no more capacity than the
rest of us to determine" its moral soundness. In Grutter, a slim
majority of the Court agreed.
174. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003).
175. Too Many Morally Charged Questions in Court, supra note 2.
